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Validity Semantics in Educational and Psychological Assessment
John D. Hathcoat
James Madison University
The semantics, or meaning, of validity is a fluid concept in educational and psychological testing.
Contemporary controversies surrounding this concept appear to stem from the proper location of validity.
Under one view, validity is a property of score-based inferences and entailed uses of test scores. This view is
challenged by the instrument-based approach, which contends that tests themselves are either valid or invalid.
These perspectives are contrasted by their ontological and epistemological emphases, as well as their breadth
of validation focus. Ontologically, these positions diverge in their alliance with psychometric realism, or the
position that attributes characterizing the aim of psychological and educational measurement exist in the
actual world and that claims about their existence can be justified. Epistemologically, these positions deviate
in the function of truth when accepting validity claims and inform distinct lines of inquiry in the validation
process. Finally, validity under the instrument-based approach is restricted to a single proposition –namely,
that observed score variation is caused by an underlying attribute. Though seemingly arbitrary, these distinct
validity semantics may have a range of implications on assessment practices.

A test is valid if it measures what it intends to measure.
Various textbooks repeat this statement despite a
number of theorists who argue that this position
oversimplifies the concept of validity as well as the
validation process (see Lissitz, 2009). However, the
semantics, or meaning, of validity is controversial in
academic discourse. This controversy has a long
history, though the contemporary debate appears to
stem from disagreements about the proper location of
validity. One view locates validity as a property of
score-based interpretations and entailed uses of test
scores (Messick, 1989; Kane, 1992). This position has
come to dominate validity theory, as evidenced by the
most recent standards for educational and
psychological testing resembling this perspective
(AERA, APA, NCME, 1999).
However, the
“instrument-based” approach challenges this view by
locating validity as a property of tests themselves
(Borsboom, 2005; Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van
Heerden, 2004). Formal testing is but one aspect of
educational
and
psychological
assessment.
Nevertheless, these two perspectives have important
ramifications for assessment practitioners.

procedures (Moss, Girard, & Haniford, 2006). Validity
semantics dictate which inferences one may legitimately
label “valid” or “invalid”.
Moreover, semantic
differences have consequences on the aims of score
validation – namely, what evidence should one seek in
the validation process. The present paper delineates
validity semantics by contrasting their ontological and
epistemological emphases, as well as their breadth of
validation focus. Ontology is a branch of metaphysics
aiming to ascertain the underlying structure of reality
(Poli, 2010). Epistemology on the other hand, studies
the nature, limitations, and justification of knowledge
(Williams, 2001). Ontological questions pertain to
“what exists,” whereas epistemological questions tend
to focus on the possibility and process of obtaining
knowledge. For example, do observed scores reflect
differences in a “real” attribute? Is such knowledge
possible, and if so, how are such claims justified or
warranted?
These philosophical questions are
fundamental to validity theory, which encompasses
both ontological (e.g. reality of attributes) and
epistemological (e.g. evidential standards) aspects of
score-based interpretations.

The concept of validity is central to assessment
processes, data-driven decisions, and reporting

Central to this paper is the concept of
psychometric realism. Psychometric realism refers to
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the view that attributes characterizing the aim of
psychological and educational measurement exist in the
actual world and that claims about their existence can
be justified (see Hood, 2009). Psychometric realism
has both an ontological and epistemic component.
Ontologically, a psychometric realist views attributes
such as “personality,” “critical thinking,” and
“intelligence” as entities that exist within the world.
Importantly, a psychometric realist also believes that it
is possible to justify claims about the existence of these
entities. An antirealist would deny at least one of these
positions. For example, an antirealist may deny the
ontological status of attributes or the possibility of
warranting claims about their existence.
There are many points of contention with respect
to validity semantics in educational and psychological
assessment (Moss et al., 2006; Newton, 2012).
However, this discussion is delimited by the work of
two prominent validity theorists. First, the argumentbased approach to validity is described (Kane, 1992,
2006) given that this view coincides with many of the
historical transformations characterizing validity
semantics. Following this account is the critique
offered by Borsboom et al., (2004), which falls under
the instrument-based approach. With respect to the
ontological, these views diverge in whether they require
adherence to psychometric realism. Likewise, these
perspectives deviate in their epistemological
characteristics, such as the role accorded to truth in
validity theory. Finally, the instrument-based approach
has a relatively narrow validation focus when compared
to the argument-based approach. Before proceeding to
this examination, the following section provides a brief
overview of the historical evolution of validity
semantics in educational and psychological testing.
A Brief History of Validity Semantics
The application of statistical concepts, such as the
theory of errors, to the measurement of mental
phenomena can be traced to the later part of the 19th
Century (see Traub, 2005). However, it was not until
the early 1900’s that validity, as a formal concept,
became a point of vivid discussion. Efforts to
articulate a theory of validity occurred within
educational and psychological testing. Other academic
disciplines share concerns with measurement error
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(Taylor, 1997); however, the “physical” sciences lack an
analogous discourse aiming to formulate a formal
theory of validity. Validity semantics, it would seem, is
primarily a concern among academicians who have
sought to apply measurement models to intraindividual
and interindividual variation in social research.
Numerous authors have provided an overview of the
historical evolution of validity theory within these
disciplines (see Kane, 2001, 2009; Lissitz & Samuelsen,
2007; Moss, Girard, & Haniford, 2006; Sireci, 1998,
2009). This section broadly outlines this development,
while emphasizing some of the philosophical
implications of distinct validity semantics.
Prior to the 1940’s, predicting subsequent
performance was a primary concern among test
developers. During this time, various advancements in
statistical techniques were gaining widespread
acceptance in the social and behavioral sciences. For
example, this period saw advancements in correlation
coefficients (Pearson, 1920; Rodgers & Nicewander,
1988), and factor analysis was developed to address
theoretical issues relevant to intelligence testing
(Spearman, 1904).
Each of these advancements
however, had slightly different implications on validity
semantics, which in turn, contributed to distinct
positions toward psychometric realism. Covariation
between two variables is fundamental to both
prediction and causation, though concerns with the
former reinforced a view of validity wherein predicting
criterion variables were paramount.
Tests were
generally valid for any criterion that it predicted
(Cureton, 1951; Guilford, 1946).
At least two
challenges existed with this view.
The first difficulty is the problem of the criterion
(Chisolm, 1973; Amico, 1995), which pertains to the
challenge of answering questions about what we know
and how we know. To recognize instances of
knowledge it seems that we must have a criterion or
procedure. To illustrate this point, Chisholm (1973)
refers to our ability to determine the quality of apples.
If we wish to identify apple quality then we need a
criterion to distinguish “good” apples from “bad”
apples. We may choose to sort apples into different
piles based upon their color, though any criterion is
adequate for this example.
The problem arises
whenever we ask whether our criterion worked in that
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color actually separated good apples from bad apples.
How can we investigate our criterion without already
knowing something about which apples are good and
bad? In order to evaluate the criterion of color it seems
that we need prior knowledge about apple quality,
which would itself depend on a different criterion.
Simply put, we appear caught within a vicious circle
wherein recognizing instances of knowledge requires a
criterion that cannot be evaluated without existent
knowledge.
When applied to educational and psychological
testing, this minimally implies that one must assume the
validity of a criterion variable when making inferences
about the validity of a newly developed instrument.
Questions about the validity of a criterion variable
require further assumptions about a new criterion, and
this could easily lead to an infinite regress (Kane, 2001).
This position towards validity therefore appears more
reasonable when the criterion variable is intrinsically
valid (Gulliksen, 1950), which may occur when using
scores to predict performance on tasks that are either
the same, or very similar to, specific demands within
occupational and educational settings. This leads to the
second challenge for predictive or criterion-related
validity, which consists of identifying adequate criterion
variables. In some situations, identifying an acceptable
criterion is problematic. This is particularly the case for
many concepts investigated within educational and
psychological testing.
Around this same period, various authors
discussed the importance of test content within validity
theory. For example, there are connections between
content validity and criterion related validity (Lissitz &
Samuelsen, 2007). Tests are constructed for a specific
purpose (Rulon, 1946), and focusing on test content
reinforced the view that items/tasks constitute samples
from a theoretical universe of possible tasks (see Sireci,
1998). An emphasis on test content, coupled with the
prior development of factor analysis (Spearman, 1904),
promoted a conceptual and statistical framework for
advancing psychometric realism (Mulaik, 1987). In
other words, the question of validity, though
multifaceted, aimed at investigating “whether a test
really measures what it purports to measure” (Kelley,
1927, p. 14). Factor analysis accords with the notion
that real attributes underlie variation in observed
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scores. Though such techniques seem aligned with
psychometric realism, many critics have argued that
factor analysis is an instrumental tool that simplifies
empirical observations (e.g. Anastasi, 1938). Under this
latter view, extracted factors reflect useful ways to
summarize observations without necessitating reference
to actual entities. If extracted factors reference entities
in the actual world, then such procedures have the
potential to provide insight into the world, as it exists.
These early controversies set the stage for broad
distinctions about the proper location of validity.
However, a seminal article by Cronbach and Meehl
(1955) eventually led to radical changes in validity
semantics, which support a departure from
psychometric realism. Cronbach and Meehl were
concerned about situations wherein a target domain
and/or a relevant criterion remained ambiguous. For
example, if an instructor were creating a geometry test
the course objectives may constitute a target domain
from which item sampling occurs. However, other
concepts of interest, such as anxiety, may cease to have
a clear domain from which to sample items or an
unambiguous criterion for investigating subsequent
predictions. In these latter cases, Cronbach and Meehl
argued that what is necessary is the establishment of
construct validity. However, their conceptualization of
construct validity relies upon the construction of a
nomological network, and this network aligns with logical
positivist aims to create a theory of scientific
knowledge without metaphysical assumptions. Stated
differently, construct validity as articulated by
Cronbach and Meehl allows one to infer the meaning
of unobservable constructs without requiring them to
exist as an entity within the world.
To understand this effort, it is first necessary to
make a distinction between theoretical and
observational language (Carnap, 1950). Theoretical
language may refer to such concepts as “temperature,”
“gravity,” and “quarks,” or to such terms as
“personality,” “intelligence,” and “anxiety”. The logical
positivist movement reflects an effort to connect
theoretical language to observational language via
logical reconstruction. For example, anxiety is not
directly observable, but instead anxiety is a theoretical
concept used to account for empirical observations.
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From a logical positivist perspective, anxiety may be
viewed as a theoretical term standing in relation to
observational language (e.g., John has a heart rate of
120 beats per minute) through correspondence rules
(e.g. increases in heart rate reflect proportionate
increases in anxiety). Construct validity consists of
placing anxiety within a nomological network. This
requires identifying law-like relationships between
anxiety and other theoretical terms within an
interlocking web or system. Theory may suggest lawlike relationships between anxiety, depression, and selfesteem. A positive correlation between anxiety and
depression, as well as a negative correlation between
anxiety and self-esteem may provide therefore provide
marginal support for such a system.
Cronbach and Meehl’s (1955) view of construct
validity reflects a strong departure from psychometric
realism, given that one may infer the meaning of
theoretical terms without requiring them to exist as
entities within the world. Thus, “scientifically speaking,
to ‘make clear what something is’ means to set forth the
laws in which it occurs” (p. 290). Theoretical terms,
such as anxiety, derive meaning from their placement
within a nomological network. Altering one aspect of
this network (e.g. anxiety is positively correlated with
self-esteem) changes the meaning of theoretical terms
within a system. With this movement away from
realism, it is but a small step toward strictly locating
validity as a property of score-based inferences and
entailed uses of test scores. There is some ambiguity
however, with respect to the proper location of validity
as discussed in this article. Cronbach and Meehl readily
identify construct validity as an interpretation to be
defended. However, they were “not in the least
advocating construct validity as preferable to other
three kinds (concurrent, predictive, content)” (p. 300).
Instead, construct validity is an additional consideration
in testing. Though they indicate that “one does not
validate a test, but only principle for making
inferences” (p. 297), there are subtle distinctions
between validity and validation. Validity may still be a
property of tests, whereas validation refers to the
process of investigating claims about a test.
Nevertheless, their conceptualization of construct
validity marks a pivotal turn in validity semantics.
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It was not until the 1970’s and 1980’s that theorist
forcefully emphasized interpretations and entailed uses
of test scores as the proper location of validity. This
view was perhaps most vehemently argued by Messick
(1975, 1989), though similar positions can be found in
various other sources (e.g. APA, AERA, NCME, 1974;
Cronbach, 1971). Under this view, tests are neither
valid nor invalid, but it is the proposed use and
interpretation of test scores that encompasses validity.
Stated differently, inferences from test scores are either
valid or invalid. To understand the rationale for this
movement, it is beneficial to consider the constructiverealist position as advocated by Messick (1998).
Messick (1998) was concerned with various
philosophical criticisms, particularly the value-laden
nature of empirical observations. Given that “theories
can no longer be tested against facts” but are instead
“relative to specific social practices of science”
(Messick, 1998, p. 36), there are dangers in presuming
that psychological concepts directly refer to a given
reality. Messick however, did not abandon realist
sympathies, and instead argued for an alternative
account that combined constructivist criticism and
psychometric realism:
“In this constructive-realist view of
psychological
measurement,
constructs
represent our best, albeit imperfect and
fallible, efforts to capture the essence of traits
that have a reality independent of our attempt
to characterize them. Just as on the realist
side there may be traits operative in behavior
for which no construct has yet been
formulated, on the constructive side there are
useful constructs having no counterpart in
reality” (p. 35).
Messick draws a subtle distinction between
constructs and the traits or attributes to which
constructs may refer (Hood, 2009). Constructs may
either refer or fail to refer to attributes that exist
irrespective of human input. Consequently, Messick
seems to adopt a form of realism wherein our
theoretical terms may correctly describe unobservable
attributes, though our epistemic accessibility to these
attributes remains problematic.
Messick (1989)
however, sought to unify semantics under the label
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“construct validity,” which broadly concerns “an
integration of any evidence that bears on the
interpretation or meaning of the test scores” (p. 7).
Thus, validity pertains to the degree to which evidence
and theory support the adequacy and appropriateness
of score-based inferences (Messick, 1989).
Many contemporary theorists have criticized this
unified picture of validity. These criticisms stem from
concerns about the ambiguity of the term “construct”
and an inability of this approach to guide validation
efforts (Borsboom, Cramer, Kievit, Scholten, & Franic,
2009; Kane, 2001). In other words, under this view it is
difficult for test developers to articulate where validity
evidence should begin and end. There also appears to
be relative consensus that nomological networks, as
originally articulated by Cronbach and Meehl (1955),
have failed to be identified in education and the social
sciences. Though it remains possible that undiscovered
law-like relationships exist, such relationship have not,
and perhaps never will be, identified in educational and
psychological research. This led to a proliferation of
what Cronbach (1988) refers to as weak validity
programs that seek to establish a loose network of illdefined interrelationships in validation research.
Nevertheless, locating validity as a property of scorebased interpretations and entailed uses has remained a
consistent theme in contemporary validity semantics.
This position is adopted within the most recent
Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing
(1999), which indicates that validity is “…the degree to
which evidence and theory support an interpretation of
test scores entailed by proposed uses” (APA, AEAR, &
NCME, p. 9). This statement implies that validity is an
open-ended evaluation that varies according to
evidential support. As such, validity is not an all-ornothing statement, but instead inferences are more or
less valid according to existing evidence.
The argument-based approach to validity
originated out of these historical developments (Kane,
2001). This approach aims to clarify validation efforts
by requiring researchers to specify assumptions and
interpretive inferences prior to seeking validity
evidence.
As previously mentioned however,
Borsboom and colleagues (2004) have criticized
locating validity as a property of score-based
inferences. Under their view, validity is a binary
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function of truth residing within tests themselves. The
following sections delineate each perspective by their
ontological and epistemological characteristics, as well
as their breadth of validation focus.
Validity Semantics under the ArgumentBased Approach
The historical developments within validity theory,
particularly the account of construct validity provided
by Cronbach and Meehl (1955), along with the unified
view of validity offered by Messick (1988), promoted
specific principles that Kane (1992, 2006) argues are
aligned with an argument-based approach. These
developments support (a) validity as a property of
interpretations and not tests, (b) validation consisting
of an extended investigation, (c) consequences of
testing as an aspect of this investigation, and (d)
subjecting interpretations, assumptions, and proposed
uses of scores to logical and empirical examination.
Instead of placing construct validity as a unifying
feature of validity theory, Kane (1992, 2013) provides a
unified view of validity by locating interpretative and
validity arguments at its’ center. Succinctly put,
individuals construct arguments for each score-based
interpretation or entailed use of test scores. Validation
consists of subjecting these inferences, and plausible
alternatives, to both logical and empirical examination.
An interpretive argument “lays the network of
inferences leading from the test scores to the
conclusions to be drawn and any decisions to be based
on these conclusions” (Kane, 2001, p. 329). Since
validity resides with an interpretation, as opposed to a
test, it is conceivable that multiple score-based
interpretations and proposed uses exist for the same set
of scores. If one developed 20 test items pertaining to
statistical hypothesis testing, relatively simple evidence
may be needed if these scores are primarily used as an
indication of achievement within a specific course. For
example, it may be possible to investigate the alignment
of items to specific learning objectives, or estimate the
generalizability of scores on observed items to a
universe of possible items. Much stronger evidence
would be required if one wished to interpret these
scores as an indication of statistical aptitude, or if
administration decided to use these scores for
placement into academic programs. Consequently, the
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content of an interpretative argument frames subsequent
validation efforts since distinct score-based interpretations
require different lines of evidential support (Kane,
2009).

Ontology. Locating validity as a property of

interpretations, as portrayed in the argument-based
approach, does not necessitate a realist or antirealist
position toward the existence of educational and
psychological attributes, traits, or skills.
A
psychometric realist, at least in the sense used within
the present article, contends that testing procedures
aim to measure entities in the actual world. As
previously discussed, an anti-realist may deny this
claim. For example, the collegiate learning assessment
(CLA) is a performance-based measure aiming to assess
critical thinking, analytical problem solving, and other
higher-level cognitive skills (Klein, Benjamin,
Shavelson, & Bolus, 2007). The realist would view
“critical thinking” as an entity in the actual world and
could conceivably argue that the CLA aims to assess
variation in this entity. Denial of this position may
occur in various ways. For example, the antirealist may
argue that at best, “critical thinking” is a concept that is
more or less useful for achieving valued aims and
purposes. Alternatively, an antirealist may remain
agnostic with respect to the existence of critical
thinking as an entity that exists in the actual world. Put
differently, an antirealist may view the existence of
critical thinking as unimportant to the theory of critical
thinking (Borsboom, 2005). The argument-based
approach to validity remains uncommitted to either the
realist or the antirealist viewpoint. This is reinforced by
recognizing a distinction between score-based
interpretations and entailed uses of test scores.
Including entailed uses of scores within the
semantics of validity indicates that this concept
incorporates the consequences resultant from testing
procedures (Kane, 2012). The aims of assessment or
testing may be indifferent to the ontological status of
unobservable theoretical entities, attributes, or skills.
For example, some researchers primarily use
standardized tests to predict subsequent performance
(Mattern, Kobrin, Patterson, Shaw, & Camara, 2009) or
they may use test scores to select candidates for
entrance into special programs. In this situation, it is
the proposed use of the scores, not the ontological
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status of an unobservable attribute, which stands in
need of validation. An a priori negation of the realist
or antirealist positions does not therefore occur under
the argument-based approach to validity.
Put
differently, the argument-based approach to validity
remains absent of ontological commitments, at least
prior to the collection of validation evidence.

Epistemology. Contrary to the ontological, which is

generally focused on the “what” of existence,
epistemological questions focus on the possibility,
constituents, and limitations of human knowledge
(Williams, 2001).
As such, the justification of
knowledge has taken a central place in epistemology as
a philosophical discipline (Chisholm, 1989), and in an
analogous way the process of validating score-based
interpretations and entailed uses of test scores is of
paramount importance within the argument-based
approach. At least two epistemological implications are
inferred from the argument-based approach: (a)
appropriate evidence is a function of interpretative
arguments and (b) validity is a tentative judgment
employed with varying degrees of certainty. These
features underscore the constructed, dynamic, and
open-ended aspects of validating interpretative
arguments (Kane, 1992) and result from locating
validity within the realm of interpretation and the
constraints imposed by specific interpretative
arguments.
Thus, each interpretative argument
establishes boundaries or parameters that guide the
validation process.
The argument-based approach is aligned with the
view that “extraordinary claims require extraordinary
evidence” (Sagan, 1980), whereas less ambitious claims
require less extraordinary evidence. For example, “it is
possible to answer questions about whether a person
can perform a job, without having any deep
understanding of how they perform the job” (Kane,
2009, p. 53). Assessment practitioners and researchers
may therefore model patterns in observed data, in such
a way, that useful predictions are facilitated without any
understanding of the underlying mechanisms that
account for observed score variation. This view is
therefore aligned with the distinction between
prediction and explanation (Pedhazur, 1997), yet once
again, the content of the interpretative argument
informs validation criteria. However, interpretative
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arguments, at least broadly speaking, are examined for
their coherence and plausibility given the available
evidence (Kane, 2012). Claims to validity are not
necessarily claims to truth, but instead reflect evaluative
judgments about a given line of evidence.

Breadth of Validation Focus. Validation efforts
under the argument-based approach are exclusively
constrained by the number and content of score-based
interpretations and proposed uses of scores. Once
articulated, an interpretive argument for a set of scores
can limit the evidence needed to support a claim.
However, given that a potentially unlimited number of
interpretations may be advanced for the same set of
scores, or the possibility that the same scores may be
used to make multiple decisions, the argument-based is
considered broad in focus. For example, the CLA may
be interpreted strictly as indicators of performance
within a target domain or as a measure of critical
thinking. Moreover, these scores could be used to
make decisions about student placement or to establish
benchmarks when making institutional comparisons. A
consequence of placing validity as property of
interpretations and uses is that each of these
possibilities, once proposed, is included within the
argument-based approach. This breadth of focus
stands in sharp contrast to the instrument-based
approach to validity.
Validity Semantics under the InstrumentBased Approach
Instead of locating validity as a property of scorebased inferences, validity is located as a property of
tests themselves under the instrument-based approach.
This position is reminiscent of earlier theorists who
indicated that tests themselves are either valid or invalid
(Kelley, 1927). Borsboom’s exposition of this view
entails an ontological emphasis requiring commitment
to psychometric realism if ever a validity claim is
accepted (Hood, 2009). As discussed below, the ability
to warrant causal inferences is the fundamental criteria
for evaluating test validity. This focus on causal
mechanisms restricts the breadth of validation focus to
an examination of such processes. Hood (2009) has
expounded upon both the ontological and
epistemological characteristics of this view, thus the
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present section entails a reformulation and expansion
of this work.
Before proceeding, a succinct summarization of
Borsboom’s validity semantics is in order. Borsboom,
Van Heerden, and Mellenbergh (2003) provide the
following definition of validity:
Test X is valid for the measurement of
attribute Y if an only if the proposition
“Scores on test X measure attribute Y” is true
(p. 323).
There are a few points to notice about this
definition. First, validity is strictly located as a property
of tests since it pertains to a single proposition
indicating that scores measure an attribute. This
definition would therefore naturally lead to questions
about the semantics of measurement, and Borsboom
(2005) relies upon the latent variable model to provide
such a framework. The latent variable model contends
that covariation between observed scores can be
explained or accounted for by unobservable entities.
The rationale for selecting the latent variable model
becomes evident when considering the following
requirements for validity claims:
A test is valid for measuring an attribute if and
only if (a) the attribute exists, (b) variations in
the attribute causally produce variations in the
outcomes of the measurement procedure
(Borsboom et al., 2004, p. 1061)
In contrast to the argument-based approach
(Kane, 1992, 2001), wherein validity is a function of
evidential support, Borsboom instead argues that
validity is a function of truth itself (see Borsboom, et
al., 2009). Consequently, the truth-value of validity
claims is a function of two conditions. First, the
attribute entailing the aim measurement must actually
exist. Secondly, differences in this attribute are causally
responsible for differences in observed scores.

Ontology. The conditions provided by Borsboom for

establishing validity require the existence of
psychological attributes. An individual who rejects
psychometric realism must therefore reject all claims to
validity under this approach (see Hood, 2009). For
example, it is technically possible that an antirealist
would accept Borsboom’s position that a test is valid if
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indeed it captures variation in real-attributes. However,
to maintain an antirealist position, which may either
deny the existence of these attributes or our ability to
detect such attributes, the antirealist would have to
reject that any test is indeed valid. To put this
differently, the antirealist may accept the validity
semantics yet discard either the ontological status of
these attributes or the epistemic possibility of
warranting such claims. The psychometric realist on
the other hand can maintain consistency irrespective of
whether a test is valid or invalid.
Locating validity as a property of tests themselves,
at least as conceived by Borsboom, appears to
necessitate psychometric realism if ever a test is
deemed valid. Accepting measures of theoretical
attributes, such as “critical thinking,” “written
communication,” and “respect for diversity,” as valid
obliges one to accept the position that these are indeed
entities within the actual world, as opposed to
instrumental devices (see Duhem, 1954; Popper, 1963).
Additionally, these attributes must exist in such a way
that they act as efficient causes on observed scores. It
should be clear however, that this idea of causation,
though aligned with latent variable theory, does not
necessarily coincide with causal efficacy within a single
individual.
For example, and as discussed by
Borsboom, the five factor model of personality
(McCrae & Costa, 1999), may account for variation
between people, yet this does not imply that these
factors reside within a single individual.
There are two important consequences of this
perspective.
First, mapping between-person and
within-person variation is of central importance. There
are dangers in presuming that between-person models
align with within-person variation. If such models
coincide, then no additional theoretical work may be
necessary. However, if between-person models are
different from within-person models then theories
must account for such discrepancies. The second
implication, which in some ways derives from the first,
suggests that underlying processes accounting for
between-person differences may be different than what
occurs within a person. For example, differences in
extraversion between people may account for patterns
in item responses. However, extraversion may be
constant within an individual. Since causality between
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X and Y requires X and Y to covary, a constant level of
extraversion could not act as a causal force within a
person (see Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & Van Heerden,
2003).
Test validity would therefore pertain to
processes occurring at both of these levels. This leads
to a consideration of the epistemological characteristics
of this position, which emphasizes an explication of
process models wherein establishing causal inferences
is essential.

Epistemology. Validity under this approach is

inherently ontological and the truth of this ontological
claim is independent of epistemological issues, or our
ability to evaluate these claims (Borsboom,
Mellenbergh, & Van Heerden, 2004). An instrument
may be valid without any existing evidential support, or
conversely an instrument may be invalid despite a line
of seemingly strong supportive evidence. Borsboom
and colleagues have argued that if the aim of
measurement is to construct an instrument that is
sensitive to variation in entities, then the truth of this
ontological claim guarantees validity. Thus “validity is
about ontology; validation is about epistemology” and
the “two should not be confused” (p. 1063). Validity is
therefore bound to the ontological status of theoretical
entities and their causal connection to empirical
observations. Without the existence of actual entities,
validity also ceases to exist. Validation on the other
hand, consists of the empirical explication of causal
processes from an attribute to differences in observed
scores. Establishing this causal connection appears to
require the existence of strong theory and a priori
knowledge about how variation in an attribute leads to
changes in observed scores.
This position departs from the evidential criteria
guiding most validation practices, which heavily relies
on investigating correlation matrices. Consider the
typical process of validation research.
First, a
researcher may create an instrument in collaboration
with content experts who provide ratings about
construct representation. Subsequent investigations
typically examine the internal structure of the
instrument (e.g. perhaps by conducting a factor analysis
along with reliability estimates). The internal structure
of the test may then be compared across different
populations, with the same population across time, or
across distinct environmental conditions. Finally,
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correlations are sought with numerous variables to
examine the external structure of the test. Generally
speaking, if both the internal structure and external
structure correspond with theoretical expectations,
then researchers feel confident that they are measuring
the intended attribute.
This line of evidential support is largely inadequate
under the instrument-based approach. To see this, it is
first necessary to be clear about measurement under
Borsboom’s approach.
Various theories of
measurement have been proposed (e.g. Stevens, 1946;
Rasch, 1960) and much of this remains controversial
(see Michell, 1999). However, Borsboom (2005) has
argued that the practice of measurement requires the
existence of entities that are responsible for producing
variation in observed scores. Measurement is therefore
both directional and causal (Borsboom et al., 2004).
This naturally aligns with the latent variable model, the
truth of which would essentially clinch the question of
validity (Borsboom et al., 2009). However, how does
one establish the truth of this model? Unfortunately,
Borsboom has not provided many details about how
this would work, though he has alluded to some
possibilities.
An obvious choice may be to conduct a
confirmatory factor analysis, which could examine how
well a theoretical model fits patterns within observed
data. However, adequate model fit does not itself
demonstrate causality and the problem of
underdetermination also poses challenges for claims to
test validity. In other words, even with adequate model
fit alternative models may equally account for the
observed data. Such issues have led Borsboom to
argue for process models specifying how variation in an
attribute leads to responses on items or tasks. Instead
of constructing an instrument and then trying to
determine what it measures, instruments are
constructed with theories detailing how differences in
an attribute lead to specific responses. Borsboom
illustrates how this may be done by referring to a
balance scale task given to children (Borsboom et al.,
2004). This task requires students to determine
whether a balance scale will tip to one side, or remain
equal, given the distribution of weights that are placed
along the scale. Theories exist about specific strategies
children use across developmental stages.
Such
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theories allow one to construct tasks so that children
relying on certain strategies will tend to fail a particular
item. These developmental strategies can be translated
into a model that investigates the extent to which latent
class membership corresponds to patterns in observed
responses (Jansen and Van der Maas, 1997). Validation
under the instrument-based approach thus extends
beyond methodological decisions detached from
theoretical considerations.
Theory is crucial for
detailing processes leading to response behavior, which
is the crux of validity under the instrument-based
approach.

Breadth of validation focus. Locating validity as a

property of tests themselves, and concurrently
requiring one to establish causal relations between
theoretical attributes and observed scores as a sole aim
of validation, restricts the breadth of focus to these
endeavors. Under the argument-based approach, the
content of interpretative inferences informs evidential
requirements in validation research. However, the
validity semantics provided by Borsboom locates
evidential criteria within the realm of causal relations.
Thus, whether the SAT is useful for admission
purposes would remain outside the purview of validity
theory. This does not imply that such questions are
unimportant or unworthy of investigation, but only that
they are separate concerns from test validity. There are
other implications of this position. For example, it is
technically inappropriate to incorporate the
consequences of testing as an aspect of validity theory.
Tests may be valid in Borsboom’s sense, yet still have
undesirable consequences in various applied settings.
Though consequences are important, the central
question of validity would instead pertain to invariance
of causal relations across different conditions and/or
populations. In sum, the validity semantics under the
instrument-based approach restricts validation efforts
to a single proposition—scores on a particular test
measure a specified attribute. Causal relationships
constitute the heart of validity and consequently inform
validation efforts.
Discussion
The concept of validity is fluid in educational and
psychological testing. Scholars have diverged in validity
semantics throughout the history of educational and
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psychological testing. Broadly speaking, validity theory
has witnessed a cyclical affinity with antirealist
perspectives. However, scattered throughout this
history are points of contention, division, and
disagreement about the proper location of validity.
Accepting that tests themselves are valid or invalid
nicely coincides with psychometric realism, or the
position that instruments indeed measure real
attributes; whereas, locating validity with the realm of
interpretation appears to more easily coalesce with
antirealist affinities in that an antirealist may
consistently accept some, but not all, test-score
interpretations as valid. Nevertheless, strictly speaking,
locating validity semantics as a property of inferences
or instruments does not alone necessitate either of
these views (Hood, 2009). What does seem important,
at least for assessment practitioners, is that these
divergent validity semantics amount to more than
arbitrary affinities. Thus far, this discussion has largely
been philosophical and theoretical in character. I
therefore wish to conclude this discussion by briefly
underscoring some of the pragmatic implications of
this debate.
Before proceeding, I will make some final
comments about the argument-based (Kane, 1992,
2013) and instrument-based (Borsboom et al., 2004)
approaches to validity. The argument-based approach
to validity is wide in scope, given that it incorporates
multiple score-based interpretations and uses. The
instrument-based approach restricts validity to one
specific interpretation – scores on Test X are caused by
variation in attribute Y. An individual who agrees with
the argument-based approach may choose to adopt the
score-based interpretation advocated by Borsboom.
Both positions are therefore consistent, at least in this
minimal respect. They do depart in important ways
however. The argument-based approach views validity
as an open-ended judgment that varies according to
evidential support. Tests are not valid or invalid, but
instead inferences derived from scores are more or less
valid. The argument-based approach also incorporates
the consequences of testing as an aspect of validity.
Borsboom (2005) entirely rejects these aspects of the
argument-based approach by articulating an account of
validity informed by measurement theory. Various
aspects of measurement theory remain controversial, so

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/pare/vol18/iss1/9
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7275/ay6p-xw09

Page 10

it is interesting to note that many theorists tend to
neglect the semantics of measurement in their account
of validity theory. Whereas Borsboom views validity as
intricately connected to the meaning of measurement,
the argument-based approach remains largely silent on
such issues.
Clearly, assessment is concerned with more than
formal “tests” per say, and the semantic differences
described in this paper have implications well beyond
formal testing.
Educational and psychological
assessment constitutes diverse aims and practices that
definitely include testing, but it also incorporates
alternative practices such as performance, portfolio,
and classroom assessment.
Though Borsboom
discusses validity as a property of a test, it seems
conceivable to broaden this view to other assessment
practices. For example, scores are often given to
student assignments, portfolios, oral presentations, and
other samples of performance-based activities. The
instrument-based approach to validity may therefore be
applicable to any assessment activity aiming to measure
variation in an attribute. The argument-based approach
to validity seems applicable to most, if not all,
assessment activities. Given the scope of assessment
activities, does adherence to psychometric realism
matter? How should we conceptualize validity within
the context of assessment? These are challenging
questions that lack a simple resolution.
Educational assessment is value-laden, in that
assessment activities generally aim to investigate the
achievement of desired student-learning outcomes.
The importance of psychometric realism, as defined in
this article, may depend upon the context in which
assessment occurs. For the sake of simplicity, one may
consider writing as a student-learning outcome. To
assess this outcome student papers may be selected
across the campus that are then scored by raters using a
common rubric. These scores presumably reflect
differences in an attribute, that of individual differences
in writing. However, what evidence do we have that
variation in the quality of writing, and not something
else, actually influences observed scores? It seems, at
least in cases such as this, that processes through which
observed scores are manifest are important validity
considerations. If for example, we find that assignment
characteristics systematically elevate or deflate scores
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then the integrity of data-driven decisions resultant
from this procedure is questionable. A similar line of
reasoning exists for institutional effectiveness, which
minimally consists of an examination of value-added
outcomes. Institutional effectiveness is an attribute
that presumably acts as an efficient cause on learning
outcomes. Mapping how variation in institutional
experiences lead to differences in student learning
outcomes is therefore crucial. This implies that the aim
of many assessment processes may implicitly assume a
form of realism.
Within other contexts however, the realist position
remains irrelevant. Consider validation efforts of the
SAT, a test that is widely used for admission purposes
across many institutions of higher education.
According to the argument-based approach, validity
evidence is necessary for each proposed use and
interpretation of these scores. If one uses the test solely
to make predictive inferences about student success in
college, then validity entails the degree to which
evidence supports this entailed use of test scores. This
specific use remains unconcerned with psychometric
realism, or the position that observed scores reflect
differences in an underlying trait or attribute. It is also
worth noting that such inferences may be valid
irrespective of test content. If self-reported frequency
of coffee consumption were highly correlated with
first-year GPA in undergraduate courses, then using
these scores for admission purposes may very well be
valid.
Such a view resembles a pragmatic or
instrumental orientation toward measurement (Stevens,
1946). In other words, whether scores are sensitive to
variation in an underlying attribute is unimportant so
long as these scores are capable of doing what we want
them to do. Under Borsboom’s approach, this line of
evidence is irrelevant to validity, which strictly involves
a causal relation between observed scores and an
underlying attribute. Validation efforts would therefore
exclusively consist of investigating underlying causal
processes through which observed scores are manifest.
This does not imply that evidence for entailed uses of
test scores is unimportant, but such questions fall
outside the scope of formal validity theory.
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suspect. This is not a point against Borsboom, but
merely an indication of how accepting this position
may radically alter validity claims within assessment
practices.
Perhaps the strength of Borsboom’s
approach, irrespective of whether one agrees with the
validity semantics, is that his view underscores a need
to investigate a relatively neglected area in educational
and psychological assessment – namely, process models
underlying observed score variation. Investigation of
these processes may be invaluable for assessment
practitioners. Furthermore, between-person models do
not necessarily correspond to models within a person.
This is an important consideration, given that distinct
processes leading to observed scores may exist across
these models. As assessment practices continue to
evolve, between-person models may be insufficient for
many of the tasks that lie ahead. However, the
importance of this distinction largely depends upon the
kinds of claims one wishes to make:
“…that 30 per cent of interindividual
variation in success in college may be
predicted from the grade point average in
high school, does not mean that 30 per cent
of the exams you passed were predictable
from your high school grades; and that there
is a sex difference in verbal ability does not
mean that your verbal ability will change if
you undergo a sex change operation”
(Borsboom, 2005, p. 77).
Both the argument-based approach and
instrument-based approach to validity are consistent
with an examination of such models. Thus the critical
question, at least for assessment practitioners, is
whether we wish to require a commitment to
psychometric realism for accepting validity claims.
Answering this question is well beyond the scope of the
present article. Nevertheless, the field of educational
and psychological assessment, to the extent that it
wishes to address validity, may eventually need to
contend with the implications of these divergent
positions.

Finally, if Borsboom’s criteria for test validity are
accepted, then the validity of most existent tests in
educational and psychological assessment remains
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